logs-update is a malicious crate published to crates.io on 2026-09-10 with zero downloads. It pretends to be a terminal progress-bar library, but renders nothing to a terminal. The whole crate steals files and sets up remote access.
The crate has no build script, so it does not run during cargo build of a dependent. It runs when someone runs its binary (for example after cargo install logs-update) or when a dependent calls its run() function.
When it runs, it does four things:
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It POSTs a machine fingerprint (username, OS, and local IP) to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/system-info.
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It reads the project's .env and its trading-bot config files and POSTs them to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/project-env.
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It walks the filesystem and POSTs the contents of .env, .json, .txt, .doc, .docx, and .xlsx files to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/files.
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On Linux, it appends an attacker's SSH public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, giving the attacker remote login as that user.
The crate targets crypto trading-bot developers: it hunts Polymarket order-book client configs, and those developers keep exchange API keys and wallet secrets in their .env files. Every version is malicious.
Attacker SSH public key appended to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (comment yyy@gmail.com): ssh-rsa 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 yyy@gmail.com
Credit: OpenSSF (source)
References
logs-update is a malicious crate published to crates.io on 2026-09-10 with zero downloads. It pretends to be a terminal progress-bar library, but renders nothing to a terminal. The whole crate steals files and sets up remote access.
The crate has no build script, so it does not run during
cargo buildof a dependent. It runs when someone runs its binary (for example aftercargo install logs-update) or when a dependent calls its run() function.When it runs, it does four things:
It POSTs a machine fingerprint (username, OS, and local IP) to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/system-info.
It reads the project's .env and its trading-bot config files and POSTs them to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/project-env.
It walks the filesystem and POSTs the contents of .env, .json, .txt, .doc, .docx, and .xlsx files to https://rust-api-jet.vercel.app/api/validate/files.
On Linux, it appends an attacker's SSH public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, giving the attacker remote login as that user.
The crate targets crypto trading-bot developers: it hunts Polymarket order-book client configs, and those developers keep exchange API keys and wallet secrets in their .env files. Every version is malicious.
Attacker SSH public key appended to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (comment yyy@gmail.com): ssh-rsa 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 yyy@gmail.com
Credit: OpenSSF (source)
References